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SHOULD TAXPAYERS PAY PEOPLE TO OBEY 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS? 
JOHN A. HUMBACH* 
W e have been hearing a lot lately about the so-called "property rights" issue-about a number of bills in Congress1 and in state 
legislatures,2 about the literally hundreds of new cases in the courts,3 
and about people rising up to demand protection from laws that im- 
pinge on property rights. Actually, by definition, laws cannot "im- 
pinge" on property rights. At least laws cannot impinge on legal 
property rights. After all, legal property rights are whatever the law 
says they are, no more, no less, and the law can be changed. 
What we are witnessing, however, is a debate about what property 
rights ought to be, or, as viewed from the other direction, a debate 
about what ought to be the American land ethic for the twenty-first 
century.4 We are in the midst of a transition, a transition about how 
we, as Americans, view the future of our national land. 
On one side of this transition is a highly motivated property rights 
movement. These defenders of private property rights are people 
who are typically energized by an understandable desire to protect 
their own economic interests-larger landowners, mining interests, 
forest owners, real estate dealers and speculators, and the like. But 
their claim is founded on a deeply rooted idea, an idea of basic fair- 
ness: "what's mine is mine." As such, these claims have a powerful 
pull on the American psyche. People identify with such claims and 
* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
1. At the time of this editing (March 25,1995). the House of Representatives had 
passed a "Private Property Protection Act of 1995," H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) (subsequently incorporated into another bill, H.R. 9). Several somewhat dif- 
ferent bills have been introduced into the Senate, and have been combined into an 
"Omnibus' Property Rights Act of 1995," S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (as 
introduced on March 23,1995). The House bill would require compensation to own- 
ers when their land, or a portion thereof, is reduced in value by more than 20% due to 
the enforcement of certain environmental laws. The Senate bill would require com- 
pensation for real property value reductions of more than 33% due to government 
actions under a much wider array of federal laws. 
2. According to a National Audubon Society database, a total of 83 "takings 
bills" had been offered in 33 states as of the end of 1994, and six of these had been 
signed into law. National Audubon Society's "Takings" Fifty State Review, A CLEAR 
VIEW (Clearinghouse on Envtl. AdvocacyIEnvtl. Working Group, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 
1994, at 3. 
3. For a more extensive discussion of several of the rare victories for owners 
suing under the Constitution, see John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary 
Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial Revision of Legislative Judg- 
ments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771 (1993). 
4. For more extended discussions on this subject, see Fred Bosselman, Four Land 
Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439 (1994); John A. 
Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989). 
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respond to them, and when they come wrapped in a philosophical 
garb of free markets and suspicion of government generally, these 
claims can be very potent indeed. 
On the other side of the debate are people who have a less obvious 
personal interest, or at least a non-economic interest, in the issue. 
These are people who believe that, to have a high quality of life, 
human beings need decent and pleasant surroundings in which to 
live-people who believe that laws like the Clean Water Act5 and the 
Endangered Species Act6 address serious environmental concerns. 
These are people who recognize that we all have a stake in our shared 
national landbase-that the land Americans walk today is the same 
land Americans will have to walk for generations to come. In short, 
these are people who believe that, as a matter of basic patriotism, we 
need to ensure that landowners treat this country like they care 
whether there is a country here fifty years from now, or a hundred 
years from now, as a decent, vital, economically viable, and beautiful 
place for people to live. 
The reality is that most people relate to both sides of this debate to 
a greater or lesser degree. Of course private property rights are im- 
portant. There is no issue about that. For most Americans, however, 
private property rights are not the only thing that is important. For 
most people, there are many other values that are also important: de- 
cent surroundings in which to live and raise a family; clean, whole- 
some waters in our rivers and reservoirs; good air to breathe; a 
healthy environment for all of God's creatures; and a beautiful coun- 
try for ourselves and for our children for generations to come. 
In fact, the very reason we have our rather considerable body of 
environmental law is because there are these other values, in addition 
to property-right values, that are also important to so many people. 
The other reason for so much of our existing environmental statutory 
law is that the common law of nuisance has proved itself, over and 
over again, to be totally inadequate to give the people and communi- 
ties of our nation the environmental protection that rightfully belongs 
to them.' For example, the common law of nuisance simply does not 
prohibit the polluting of water bodies or the pollution of the air unless 
certain thresholds are met.* Qpically, individual polluters do not 
meet the threshold even though, cumulatively, their contaminants de- 
5. 33 U.S.C. $5 1251-1376 (SUPP. V 1993). 
6. 16 U.S.C. 5 1531 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
7. See, e.g., Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) (noise, fumes, 
bright lights); Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (App. Div. 1932) 
(refusal to enjoin operation of heavily polluting coke plant erected across street from 
plaintiff's home). 
8. Id See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $5 826-31. See also Jeff 
L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 
ALB. L. REV. 189, 212-36 (1990). 
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grade or destroy major waterbodies or pollute the air to seriously un- 
healthy  level^.^ 
The fundamental problem, however, is that across our nation, there 
are literally millions of acres of important natural resource lands- 
shore lands, dunes, wetlands, reservoir watersheds, endangered spe- 
cies habitats-that have relatively little commercial value in their 
present natural condition. Yet, many owners are understandably 
tempted to supplant and destroy the long-term natural resource values 
of these lands to reap a return in their own lifetimes. 
People often talk about buying such lands and, indeed, some gov- 
ernment purchases to protect these lands are possible. Nevertheless, 
we must face the fact that government purchases are simply not a fea- 
sible way to protect the millions of acres of our nation's lands that are 
threatened by poorly conceived development or improperly executed 
utilization. Overall, for these millions of acres, only two practical 
choices exist. Either we can adopt land use laws that will protect and 
defend these lands, our nation's one and only national landbase, from 
shortsighted modifications; or, we can surrender the fate of our na- 
tional land, and the quality of the lives of our descendants, to the self- 
interested decisions of a relative few. 
Thus far, the choice that we have made is to not leave the future of 
America's land and natural resources to the relative handful of people 
who happen to be the current owners in our generation. America is a 
republic and, as such, its destiny belongs first and foremost to the peo- 
ple as a whole, not to some narrow class of large landowners as it was 
in, for example, the England from which we rebelled. Our present 
body of environmental law represents our nation's democracy-driven 
choice that some land uses are just too socially intolerable to allow. 
Even the self-appointed "defenders" of property rights seldom 
overtly deny that our nation's environmental laws serve important 
purposes. The issue, as usually phrased, is different. The issue is 
framed as whether the government should compensate people for the 
burdens of complying with these laws. In other words, should our na- 
tion's taxpayers, you and I, have to pay people not to do things that 
the national legislature has determined to be bad for other people, 
bad for the community, or bad for the nation as a whole? 
Should taxpayers have to pay people not to put pollutants into 
streams and reservoirs? Should taxpayers have to pay people not to 
kill off entire species? Should taxpayers have to reach into their pock- 
ets and pay people not to disperse development searnlessly across the 
countryside, relentlessly consuming, fragmenting, and degrading our 
nation's remaining natural lands until almost all is gone? Should we, 
9. For a more detailed discussion, see John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of 
Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J .  ENVTL. L. 1, 17-22 (1993). 
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in short, have to pay people not to engage in land-uses that have been 
determined to be too socially unacceptable to allow? 
The property rights advocates say this is all a fairly simple matter. 
To them, it is a simple matter of the Takings Clause of the Constitu- 
tion. Now, the Takings Clause, itself, is simple: "nor shall private 
, property be taken for public use, without just compen~ation."'~ The 
original intent of this language was also simple. The Framers of the 
Constitution intended that the Takings Clause only apply to physical 
takings, not to mere regulations on the use of land." To be sure, 130 
years after the Constitution's Bill of Rights12 was adopted, the import 
of the Takings Clause was extended to encompass not just physical 
takings but also certain extreme forms of land-use regulation. The 
1922 case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,13 prompted this un- 
abashed burst of judicial activism, and has remained a favorite of the 
property rights defenders. 
It is striking to me that Pennsylvania Coal has become such a favor- 
ite of people who, supposedly, favor property rights protection. Penn- 
sylvania Coal is not really a property rights protection case at all. 
Instead, it is a case that stands for a very different proposition, 
namely, that some people's property deserves more protection than 
other people's property. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court 
struck down a state statute enacted to protect people's homes from 
being destroyed due to the undermining activities of the coal compa- 
nies that owned the coal under the homes.14 
The Supreme Court decided to favor the coal company's property 
rights over the homeowner's, reasoning: "[tlhis is the case of a single 
private house,"15 and "a source of damage to such a house is not a 
public nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in differ- 
10. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
, 11. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2900 n.15 (1992). 
See also Scott M. Reznick, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Early 
19th Century America, 40 U .  CHI. L. REV. 854 (1973) (reviewing the cases in which, 
absent physical invasion, no compensation was required); William M. Treanor, Note, 
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifih 
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) (reviewing evidence of the intentions of 
James Madison and his contemporaries). 
During the nineteenth century, the "immense weight of authority" held that there 
was no requirement of compensation under the Takings Clause unless the governmen- 
tal act consisted of a "physical invasion of the real estate." Gibson v. United States, 
166 U.S. 269,275-76 (1897) (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,642 
(1878)). 
12. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. The Takings Clause is contained in the Fifth 
Amendment of the Bill of Rights. 
13. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (striking down a law to prohibit coal companies from ex- 
tracting certain coal that formed the subjacent support for various kinds of surface 
structures and improvements). 
14. Id. at 414. 
15. Id. at 413. 
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ent places."l%fter considering the respective property interests in- 
volved, the Court concluded: "[tlhe statute does not disclose public 
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the [coal 
company's] constitutionally protected rights.'' In short, when mere 
homeowners' interests in protecting their homes collided with a coal 
company's interests in utilizing its property rights, the homeowners' 
rights carried so little "public interest" that they (and the laws that 
protected them) had to yield. To understand what the so-called 
"property rights" movement is really all about, re-read Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon. 
However, despite the judicial activism of Pennsylvania Coal, laws 
are not unconstitutional merely because they may have the incidental 
effect of diminishing the value of land. As the Supreme Court deter- 
mined in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,18 it is "a reality we 
nowadays acknowledge explicitly" that "government may . . . affect 
property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to com- 
pensate." And the reason is obvious: otherwise "government hardly 
could go on."19 Nearly everything the government does has the po- 
tential to raise or lower property values. The Federal Reserve raises 
the discount rate, and bond values drop. The government deregulates 
the airlines, and some of them go bankrupt. It deregulates the savings 
and loans, and the private economic impacts are even worse. A state 
enacts stiffer Driving-While-Intoxicated laws, and marginal saloons go 
broke. 
Yet, by the same token, when the government builds a new inter- 
state highway or underwrites flood insurance, the effect may be to 
raise property values. Again, to quote Justice Scalia, "[tlhe fact is that 
virtually all [economic] regulation benefits some segments of the soci- 
ety and harms others."20 However, this fact does not make such laws 
invalid. 
Consider, for example, Mr. Lucas himself. Lucas owned two beach- 
'front lots that he claimed to.be worth $1 million." He asserted that 
the government took all of the economic value of his property by for- 
bidding him to build on those lots." Lucas brought suit and'was 
awarded nearly $1.5 million of taxpayers' hard-earned money.23 Con- 
sider, however, why Lucas's two lots had a fair market value of $1 
million. 
16. Id 
17. Id at 414. 
18. 112 S. Ct. 2886,2897 (1992). 
19. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. 
20. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365,377 (1991) (up- 
holding a billboard regulation with preferential effects against an antitrust challenge). 
21. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. 
22. Id 
23. Id. at 2890. 
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It turns out that Mr. Lucas's two lots had a value of $1 million for 
one key reason-because the federal government runs a program to 
underwrite flood insurance for shorefront property, which is especially 
vulnerable to hurricanes and other big storms. Without such flood 
insurance there would be no mortgages because banks do not lend 
money for beach houses unless they are properly insured. Without 
mortgages there would be no buyers. Without buyers there would not 
be a $1 million land value because, as a matter of simple economics, 
fair market value depends on there being demand for the property. 
As for the flood insurance that is the key to it all, there is, of course, 
only one insurer around who is gullible enough to back up the risks 
involved: that is us, the American taxpayers. It is the federal govern- 
ment's flood insurance program that makes possible reasonable cost 
insurance for these houses. 
Therefore, the government made possible the insurance, which 
made possible the mortgages, which made possible the buyers, which 
gave the two Lucas lots their $1 million value. Without the insurance, 
they would have been worth what beaches have always been worth- 
perhaps as little as the value of the sand. 
When the government's actions create a high value for beachfront 
property, everybody seems to like that. What if, however, the govern- 
ment's actions happen to reduce the very same values that govern- 
ment actions have created. Should the taxpayers have to pay the 
amount of the reduction, as they did in Lucas? It does not seem fair 
that they should. Thus, the real question here is whether taxpayers 
should have to pay to prevent socially undesirable uses of land, even 
when the Constitution does not require it, and even when, for the last 
200 years, the law has not required it? 
The concept here seems to be that we have two kinds of laws in this 
country. First, there is the kind of law that people are supposed to 
obey. Then, there is the other kind of law, the kind of law that certain 
people should not have to obey-unless they get paid. 
Laws against using your property as a pornography shop or to grow 
marijuana are good examples of the first kind of law. Nobody expects 
to get paid to obey that kind of law. When there is a law against filling 
a wetland, or a law against destroying some of our nation's prime agri- 
cultural lands, these laws would fall into the second category. Not 
long ago, an outfit called Whitney Benefits received a $60 million 
judgment, payable out of taxpayer dollars, as its reward for complying 
with a law of the latter type.24 
Now, most of us are wiling to obey the law for free. We do not ask 
to be paid, even when the law in question happens to be based on 
values we do not necessarily agree with. For decades, most urban 
24. Whitney Benefits v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1990). cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 952 (1991). 
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property owners have accepted and lived with the proposition that 
you cannot necessarily change the use of your land just because you 
can make a profit doing it. This is a principal effect for the vast major- 
ity of American landowners (homeowners) of ordinary local zoning 
laws: if you own a single family house and lot, you cannot tear it down 
and replace it with condos, or a little grocery store, or a medical arts 
building, just because you could make money doing it. People have 
accepted this for decades. 
Here, then, is a basic difference between the so-called defenders of 
property rights and the rest of us. They want to get paid for the incon- 
venience of obeying the law of the land, at least when it comes to laws 
that are aimed at protecting the land itself. 
Why do some people think they should be paid to obey our nation's 
environmental laws? In fact, I think their reasons are understanda- 
ble-not right, but understandable. There are many good and decent 
people who just honestly do not think there is anything wrong with 
doing the kinds of things environmental laws prohibit. You have to 
remember, it is not long ago that wetlands were "marshes and 
swamps," noxious places that people wanted to drain and fill. Wild 
animals were just in the way. A lot of old historic buildings in your 
town represented the opposite of "progress." Beaches and flood 
plains were ideal places to build a house, and farms and forests were 
often seen as holding areas until somebody came along to put the land 
to productive use. 
Knowledge and widely held values have evolved, but there are still 
many good and decent people who just do not take seriously environ- 
mental harms that other good and decent people take very seriously. 
Many people simply do not believe that destroying wetlands is a bad 
thing to do, or that killing off entire species is a serious affair. Many 
people simply do not believe there is anything wrong with building on 
beaches and dunes or in flood plains, or that the gradual death-by-a- 
thousand-cuts of a whole water body really justifies saying to any one 
watershed owner: "you can't take your nick; we're drawing the line 
here." 
That is what the so-called property rights debate is really all about. 
It is not a disagreement about property rights, as such. It is a disa- 
greement about values, and to some degree scientific knowledge asso- 
ciated with a handful of questionable land-uses. This problem exists 
because, as I mentioned earlier, we are in a transition, a transition 
about how we as Americans view the future of our national land. The 
question is, what do you do when you are in a transition? What do 
you do when you have a country with 260 million people, a depleting 
natural resource base, and many, many different views and different 
values about what is important and what should be a priority. It is a 
question of "who decides?" Who decides some of the most difficult 
and controvertible questions of our time? 
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I do not think there is an easy answer here, and anybody who has an 
easy answer (such as, "let the landowners decide for us all") is pretty 
likely wrong. Nevertheless, here is my answer-well, my answer and 
the Supreme Court's. 
For me and the U.S. Supreme Court, it is the fundamental premise 
of democracy that when different people have varying values on issues 
like protecting the national land, it has to be the values of the major- 
ity, as represented in the elected legislature, that get reflected in the 
The dissidents do not have a right to payment for obeying the 
law just because they dissent, even if they happen to think that the law 
in question makes no sense. There is nothing in the Constitution that 
limits the legislative majority's rights in this regard (except, of course, 
if there is a physical taking of property or its functional equivalent, a 
total diminution of value).26 
So, what is the big deal here? 'If our elected Congress wants to ex- 
tend compensation beyond what the Constitution requires, who can 
object? After all, fifty-one percent of the voters in this country voted 
for the present congressional majority in the contested elections last 
fall. True, fifty-one percent is not an overwhelming majority, but a 
majority is a majority. If the majority wants to extend owners' rights 
to compensation beyond what the Constitution requires, who can 
object? 
One possible objection, perhaps, is that paying landowners to obey 
the law of the land would totally disrupt the difficult balance between 
private rights and public protection that is enshrined in our Constitu- 
tion, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. But, so what if a new com- 
pensation scheme disrupts the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Constitution. If that is where the majority's values fall, should it not 
be the law? 
For me, the real objection here is something different. The real ob- 
jection is that this property rights legislation looks a lot like a decep- 
tion. It looks like a deceptive attempt to do something the majority 
does not want. It is a sneak attack on our nation's environmental 
laws. 
The proponents of this new compensation legislation should come 
right out and call it the "Environmental Rights Abolition Act of 
1995," because that is what it is. Rights are just the correlatives of 
25. "Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere 
. . . . Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the govern- 
ment." Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,660-61 (1887). And "in this particular a large 
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the inter- 
ests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such 
interest." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). 
26. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892-95. 
Heinonline - -  6 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 430 1994-1995 
PAYING TAXPAYERS 
duties; one person's duty is another person's right.27 Hence, whenever 
you abolish somebody's duties, or make them too costly to enforce, 
the effect is to abolish somebody else's rights. 
We know the reason why the proponents do not forthrightly call 
their legislation the "Environmental Rights Abolition Act of 1995." 
They do not do so because then it would not sell. Polls indicate that 
the vast majority of Americans support our nation's environmental 
laws and do not think those laws go too far.28 That does not, however, 
mean that there is any real issue about property rights. Just about 
everybody recognizes that our system of private property is essential 
to our enjoying a level of material well-being that is unsurpassed in 
history. Just about everybody also agrees, however, that there are 
some uses of property that are simply too intolerable to allow. Maybe 
it is using your land to grow marijuana. Maybe it is running an unsani- 
tary tenement house. Maybe it is an adult magazine store next to a 
junior high school (my guess, a very profitable use of real estate). Or 
maybe it is a junkyard or waste transfer station right in the middle of a 
residential neighborhood. Whatever your favorite anti-social use of 
land might be, the point is that just about everybody agrees that there 
are some uses of property that are too unacceptable to allow, and that 
the taxpayers should not have to pay people not to make those uses. 
In summary, the real dispute is not about property rights. It is a 
dispute about a handful of questionable land-uses. Some people hon- 
estly believe that these land-uses are not too socially intolerable to 
allow, while others think they are too socially intolerable to allow. 
These are uses such as filling wetlands or wrecking historic buildings, 
or building houses on beaches and dunes-uses as to which there are 
differences in understandings and differences in the values that people 
hold. 
When you get down to it, to focus on property rights, as such, is 
really a distraction, a device to turn our eyes from what is really at 
stake. The real question is not about property rights. The real ques- 
tion is, what right does our nation have to protect itself from the 
shortsighted destruction of its national land? What right does a nation 
have to protect the land on which the quality of its citizens' lives de- 
pends? I say our nation has plenty of right. For even though private 
property rights are important, no nation can bind itself to pay off 
those who, if not paid, would harm or waste its natural resources. No 
nation can leave the quality of its land or of its children's lives to the 
27. WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING 35-50 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1919) (also found at 23 YALE L.J. 
16 (1913)). 
28. According to a recent TimelCNN poll, for example, 88% of Americans con- 
sider environmental protection to be "very important" or "one of the most impor- 
tant" problems facing the country today. Dick Thompson, Congressional Chain-Saw 
Massacre, TIME, Feb. 27, 1995, at 58. 
Heinonline - -  6 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 431 1994-1995 
432 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI 
self-interested decisions of a relative few. No nation can give up its 
right to defend its national land. 
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